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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuB PRocBss-CoERCED CoNFESSIONS

STEIN CASE-Stein v. People of State of New York,1 a coerced
confession case decided by the Supreme Court last June, at first suggests
some rather startling propositions about the effect of a denial of procedural due process. Since Brown v. Mississippi2 in 1936 it has been
well settled that the admission of a coerced confession into evidence in
AND THE

1346 U.S. 156, 73 S.Ct. 1077 (1953).
2297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936).
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a state3 criminal proceeding contravenes the due process guaranty of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In the confession cases subsequently
considered by the Supreme Court it has been consistently held that the
admission of an extorted confession vitiates the entire proceeding and
renders the conviction void. 4 Moreover, the cases have indicated that
where a coerced confession has been used in evidence the conviction
must fall even though there is evidence apart from the confession sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. 5 Indeed, this is in accord with the
general constitutional doctrine that a denial of procedural due process
is jurisdictional in nature, resulting in a nugatory proceeding irrespective of the weight of evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused. 6
However, the majority of the Court in the Stein case held that even
though a coerced confession may7 have been admitted into evidence,
the conviction would be sustained because there was other evidence
sufficient to warrant a finding of guilty by the jury. The purpose of
this comment is to examine the implications of this decision and to
attempt to determine to what extent it overrules well-settled constitutional principles. 8
3 The Supreme Court has exacted an even higher standard than due process in exercise of its general supervisory powers over federal courts. McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608 (1943). See also 50 MxcH. L. R.Ev. 772 (1952). While this
comment will be confined to due process requirements in state criminal proceedings, these
requirements apply a fortiori in the federal courts.
4 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472 (1940); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S.
547, 62 S.Ct. 1139 (1942); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596,
68 S.Ct. 302 (1948); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949); Turner v.
Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 69 S.Ct. 1352 (1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68,
69 S.Ct. 1354 (1949).
5 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 at 597, 64 S.Ct. 1208 (1944); Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401 at 404, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 at 599,
68 S.Ct. 302 (1948); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 at 63, 72 S.Ct. 141 (1951);
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 at 190, 72 S.Ct. 599 (1952). See 66 HARv. L. R.Ev.
125 (1952).
6Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437 (1927); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265 (1923); Avery v.
State of Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 73 S.Ct. 891 (1953).
7 The Court decided the case in the alternative: (I) there was evidence to support a
jury finding that the confessions were not coerced, and (2) if they were coerced, their
submission did not make unconstitutional a conviction based on other evidence. Therefore,
it is impossible to state whether the confessions were found to be coerced or voluntary.
8 Several problems arising in the confession cases, such as what constitutes coercion
for the purpose of due process and the scope of review by the Supreme Court, are outside
the scope of this comment. See generally Bader, "Coerced Confessions and the Due Process
Clause," 15 BROOKLYN L. R.Ev. 51 (1948); lnbau, ''The Confession Dilemma in the United
States Supreme Court," 43 ILL. L. R.Ev. 442 (1948); McCormick, "Some Problems and
Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions," 24 Tex. L. R.Ev. 239 (1946); Wicker,
"Some Developments in the Law Concerning Confessions," 5 VAND. L. R.Ev. 507 (1952);
comments, 50 MICH. L. R.Ev. 567 (1952); 50 MxcH. L. R.Ev. 1367 (1952); 28 N.C. L.
R.Ev. 390 (1950).
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I. The Dilemma in Instructing the Jury
A. The Facts of the Stein Case.I' The defendants were tried for
the crime of felony murder1° in New York. Confessions obtained from
two of the defendants, Cooper and Stein, were submitted to the jury,
along with other evidence, since the New York practice is to submit
the issue of the voluntariness of a confession to the jury when the trial
judge :finds that it presents a fair question of fact. The jury was instructed to consider the confessions as evidence of the guilt of the
defendants only if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
confessions were voluntary and free from coercion. The jury returned
a general verdict of guilty. On review by certiorari in the Supreme
Court the part played by the confessions and the :finding of the jury
as to their voluntariness was uncertain and unascertainable, requiring
the Court to consider the constitutional effect of either alternative, i.e.,
that the jury found the confessions v~luntary, or that the jury found
them coerced and convicted the defendants on the basis of other evidence. In either event, the Court held that the convictions were valid.
Speaking for six members of the Court,11 Justice Jackson held that the
jury might have found the confessions voluntary tested by due process
standards,1 2 but that if it found the confessions coerced, acquittal was
not required in view of other evidence sufficient to warrant conviction.
B. The Role of the Jury. There are two principal views with
respect to the role of the jury in determining the use of a confession
as evidence in a criminal proceeding. The use of a confession raises
somewhat different problems under these two views.
I. The orthodox rule. Although followed by only a minority of
states today,13 the orthodox rule is that the admissibility of a confession,
9 One aspect of the case is not discussed-the problem of Wissner, a third defendant
who did not confess but was implicated by the confessions of the other two defendants.
The court held that no constitutional right of Wissner was violated. This case is popularly
known as "The Reader's Digest Murder Case"; for a lighter treatment of the case prior to
the Supreme Court decision, see OURSLER, THE REAI>Bn's ThGBST MtrnDBR CASB (1952).
10 First degree murder because committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of a
felony. N.Y. Penal Law (McKinney, 1944) §1044(2).
11 Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Burton, Clark, Minton and Reed joined in the
majority opinion. Separate dissenting opinions were filed by Justices Black, Frankfurter,
and Douglas.
12 I.e., the confessions were not obtained by use of physical violence or psychological
coercion, nor did illegal detention render them inadmissible. For general treatment of due
process standards, see references in note 8 supra.
13 According to 170 AL.R. 569 (1947) only twelve jurisdictions are definitely committed to this rule. The problem is complicated by the fact that in some states it is not
clear what rule is followed. Wigmore indicates in his treatise that this is the majority rule,
but his citations, particularly considering those in the supplement, do not support this
statement. 3 WIGMORB, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §861 (1940). See also note 18 infra.
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like any other piece of evidence, is a question of law for the judge.14
If the trial judge rules the confession admissible, the evidence adduced
at the preliminary inquiry by the court relating to the circumstances
under which the confession was given is sent to the jury, along with
the confession, and the jury is instructed that it may determine the
weight or credibility to be given to the confession,15 as in the case of
any other evidence submitted to the jury.
Under this view that the admissibility of a confession is determined
solely by the court, it would seem that the failure to exclude the confession would be so prejudical that a new trial would be required, if
the ruling is found to be erroneous on appeal. The majority opinion
in the Stein case indicates that where this is the practice the conviction
would normally fall with the confession,1 6 but the important point to
note is that double jeopardy concepts do not prevent the ordering of
a new trial in this event.17 Hence, the Stein decision probably does
not affect those states which follow the orthodox rule that the judge
determines the admissibility of confessions.
2. The prevailing practice. The prevailing rule in the United
States today is that the trial judge makes only a preliminary determination on the admissibility of a confession, leaving to the jury the resolution of the question of voluntariness, and hence ultimate admissibility .18 As will be recalled from the statement of the facts in the
Stein case, New York follows this practice. It is in jurisdictions following this view that the confession dilemma becomes acute. In the
Stein case, the defendants requested an instruction to the jury that if
it found the confessions to have been coerced it must return a verdict
of acquittal. Under such an instruction, if the jury £.nds the confession
submitted to it to have been extorted and returns a verdict of acquittal
solely because of the use of the confession, the defendant would go
free, for double jeopardy concepts would prevent a new trial. Obviously, such a result would be intolerable and would be a grave miscarriage of justice. Yet this would seem to have been the required
instruction in cases where there was a ~onfession and independent
14 3 WIGMOBE, EVIDENCE,
15 Ibid.

3d ed., §861 (1940).

16 Principal case at 191-192.
11 United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192 (1896). Cf. Brock v. North
Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 73 S.Ct. 349 (1953).
18170 A.L.R. 569 (1947); 5 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 130 (1948); McCormick, "Some
Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions," 24 TEx. L. REv. 239 at
250-251 (1946). Wigmore terms this practice heresy. 3 WIGMOBE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed.,
§861 (1940). For a good judicial discussion of the problem, see State v. Crank, 105 Utah
332, 142 P. (2d) 178 (1943) (holding admissibility to be a question of law for the judge).
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evidence which must be submitted to the jury for simultaneous deliberation, if the position of the dissenters had been adopted. 19 The
use of a special verdict or interrogatories, a possible alternative, has not
been developed in American criminal procedure,20 and there is some
doubt as to its constitutionality.21 Other alternatives under a doctrine
contrary to that of the Stein case would seem to demand either a return
to the orthodox rule of requiring the judge to pass on the admissibility
of confessions, or the use of only those confessions to which the accused
fails to object.22 However, as a result of the Stein decision, jurisdictions following the practice of submitting the confession to the jury
when it presents an issue of fact as to voluntariness apparently may
continue to do so by instructing the jury to disregard the confession
if it finds the confession to have been involuntary.

II. Effect of Evidence Apart from a Confession Sufficient to Convict
It is quite clear from language in the cases prior to Stein that even
though evidence apart from the confession might be sufficient to sustain
the jury's verdict, if the evidence contains an involuntary confession
the conviction cannot stand.23 Whether this was ever expressly held
is doubtful,24 but it unquestionably accords with well-settled due pro19 Of course, if the Supreme Court had reversed in this case, it would not have prevented retrial of these defendants. See note 17 supra.
20 E.g., no provisions for special verdicts or the use of interrogatories may be found in
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See also principal case at 178.
21 The common law concept of jury trial in criminal cases embraced only a general
verdict. A special verdict may well be held to be an impairment of jury trial. People v.
Tessmer, 171 Mich. 522 at 529, 137 N.W. 214 (1912); State v. Boggs, 87 W.Va. 738 at
749, 106 S.E. 47 (1921). However, it should be noted that the Federal Constitution
imposes no requirement of jury trial on the states. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20
S.Ct. 448 (1900); Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 13 S.Ct. 105 (1892).
22 As a practical matter, it would seem that the accused would object if he has counsel
where the circumstances of the acquisition of the confession provide a possible argument
that the confession was coerced.
23 See note 5 supra.
24 Jn most of the cases where these statements were made they were dicta, in that the
Court held that the confessions were not in fact coerced. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596,
64 S.Ct. 1208 (1944); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S.Ct. 141 (1951); Stroble
v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 72 S.Ct. 599 (1952). In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68
S.Ct. 302 (1948), the only question decided was whether the confession was coerced, the
Court finding that it was. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945),
comes closest to holding that where evidence apart from a confession is sufficient to convict,
and a coerced confession is admitted, due process is violated. However, only four members
of the Court joined in the majority decision on this point. Four justices dissented. Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion turned the tide in favor of reversal, but his opinion was
based on somewhat different grounds, i.e., that considering all the factors, Malinski was
denied a fair trial. Id. at 417-418.
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cess concepts. 25 In view of the Stein case it becomes important to
determine to what extent such language and settled doctrines are now
overruled.
A. Bases for Exclusion of a Coerced Confession. The traditional
rationale for the exclusion of involuntary confessions, as a general rule
of evidence, is that they are testimonially untrustworthy, lacking in
probative value as evidence.26 This theory has been articulated by
several members of the Supreme Court as the constitutional criterion
for determining whether there has been a denial of due process.27 A
second theory is that admission of a forced confession violates the
privilege against self-incrimination. 28 However, the most widely accepted criterion for testing the constitutional validity of the use of a
confession was stated by Justice Roberts in Lisenba 11. California:
"The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in
the use of evidence, whether true or false." 29 Clearly this goes beyond
the requirement of reliability, and in effect often amounts to an attempt
to regulate police conduct in the acquisition of evidence.30 This concept of due process has been decried by writers,3 1 and even disclaimed
by the Court on occasion.32
It is not clear whether the denial of due process under this "fundamental unfairness" test results from the extraction of the confession or
its admission into evidence. Illegality in the manner of obtaining
evidence is not a valid basis for objecting to its admissibility under
25 See note 6 supra.
26 3 WIGMORB, EvroBNCE, 3d
27 See Jackson,
in Watts v.

ed., §822 (1940).
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 at 59-60, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949);
Burton, J., in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 at 607, 68 S.Ct. 302 (1948).
28 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183 (1897). Justices Black and
Douglas, consistent with their thesis expounded in dissent in Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947), would make the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth
Amendment a part of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment See dissenting
opinions of Black and Douglas in the principal case. See also comment, 50 MICH. L. R:Ev.
567 at 570 (1952), for a discussion of self-incrimination as a basis for excluding a coerced
confession.
20 314 U.S. 219 at 236, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941).
30 This third theory is termed "protection against illegality in procedure theory" in
50 MicH. L. R:Ev. 567 at 571 (1952). See also Perlman, ''Due Process and the Admissibility of Evidence," 64 HARv. L. R:Ev. 1304 at 1309 (1951); Allen, ''Due Process and
State Criminal Procedure: Another Look," 48 N.W. Umv. L. REv. 16 at 20 (1953); 28
N.C.L. R:Ev. 390 (1950); 52 CoL. L. R:Ev. 423 (1952); l BAYLOR L. R:Ev. 171 (1948);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952).
31 Waite, "Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence," 42 MICH. L. R:Ev. 679 and 909
(1944); 3 WIGMORB, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §851 (1940); Bader, "Coerced Confessions and
the Due Process Clause," 15 BnooKLYN L. REv. 51 (1948); Inbau, "The Confession
Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court," 43 ILL. L. R:Ev. 442 (1948).
3 2 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949).
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common law doctrines,33 and in several unlawful search-and-seizure
cases arising in state courts the Supreme Court has held the admission
of such evidence consistent with due process, even though the acquisition of the evidence violated due process.34 This would seem consonant with a trustworthiness theory as to the admissibility of evidence.
However, Rochin v. California35 indicates that shocking conduct in the
extraction of evidence, despite its veracity, may infringe due process.
In the confession cases the controlling question in determining admissibility according to due process criteria is usually whether the activities
of the police in obtaining the confession amounted to coercion. It
would seem impossible and highly artificial to attempt to divorce the
extraction of a confession from its use, for the circumstances of its
extraction determine its admissibility. In appealing a conviction, however, the gravamen of a defendant's petition for reversal is a denial of
a fair trial, not a disregard of due process prior to his trial.36 Hence,
in the final analysis, it is the admission of the confession which constitutes the violation of due process.
What is the effect of Stein on these theories? Language in the
majority opinion indicates that the result rested in part on a trustworthiness theory; it was said that the Court would overturn a verdict
which could be based on other sufficient evidence only if it construed
the due process clause as requiring a rigid exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence, rather than as simply prohibiting conviction on inherently
untrustworthy evidence37 Justice Douglas in his dissent criticized this
language in the majority opinion, arguing that the trustworthiness test
is a departure from the rationale of prior decisions.38 Whether in fact
this decision indicates a return to the trustworthiness test may be
doubted, 39 as will appear more fully below.
83 8 WxcMoRB, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2183 (1940).
84 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
U.S. 117, 72 S.Ct. 118 (1951).
85 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952).
36Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 at 235, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941). However, the
defendant may have a civil cause of action against police officers, e.g., under the Federal
Civil Rights statutes. See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 71 S.Ct. 576 (1951).
37 Principal case at 192.
88 Principal case at 207.
39 Justice Jackson has rather consistently espoused the trustworthiness criterion [except
in Rochin v. Califoxnia, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952)], but he has not obtained
much support from other members of the Court. See comment, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1367
at 1377 (1952); Jackson's opinion in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 at 59-60, 69 S.Ct.
1347 (1949). Perhaps Justice Burton also would apply the trustworthiness test; see Haley
v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 at 607, 68 S.Ct. 302 (1948).
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B. Corroborated Coerced Confessions. Most states require corroboration in the form of evidence independent of a confession tending
to establish the corpus delicti in any case where the state relies on a
confession, on the theory that confessions are generally an unreliable
class of evidence. 40 But suppose a state allows the use of a confession
which is admittedly involuntary but which is independently established
as true by other evidence?41 This is a situation somewhat akin to the
facts in the Stein case except that the confession there had not yet been
found coerced at the time it was submitted to the jury. Does the decision in Stein now legalize such a practice? Apparently, this precise
question has never been ruled on by the Supreme Court,42 but prior
language of the Court clearly indicates that the use of a coerced confession even though _corroborated by independent evidence would
amount to a denial of due process,43 and this has been understood to
be the rule. 44
It may be argued that if trustworthiness is the constitutional criterion, then a coerced confession corroborated by other evidence should
not be regarded as a denial of due process under the Stein decision,
since the possibility of unreliability has been dispelled. However, it
is. doubtful whether a majority of the Court would accept this argument. In the Rochin case, a unanimous Court held that evidence
obtained as a result of stomach-pumping was iµadmissible, despite its
unquestionable trustworthiness. Moreover, as pointed out above,45
the opinion of Justice Jackson in the Stein case indicates that in those
states where the court determines the admissibility of a confession, an
erroneous admission of a confession found on appeal to have been
coerced will result in reversal. This suggests that the Stein case does
not stand for the proposition that due process permits a coerced confession to be admitted when corroborated by other evidence, but rather
40 McCormick, "Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions," 24 TEx. L. REv. 239 at 245 (1946).
41 Some states, including Texas, apparently permit this practice. See l BAYLOR L.
REv. 171 (1948).
~2 This is essentially the same problem discussed in note 24 supra. See also comment,
50 MrcH. L. REv. 1367 at 1371 (1952).
43Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 at 50, n. 2, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 at 173, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952), where it is said in dictum that coerced
confessions "are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained
in them may be independently established as true." Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 at
190, 72 S.Ct. 599 (1952).
· 44 ''The rule now makes inadmissible confessions which may be corroborated by independent evidence." Perlman, "Due Process and the Admissibility of Confessions," 64 HARv.
L. REv. 1304 at 1309 (1951); 1 BAYLOR L. REv. 171 at 177-178 (1948); 50 MrcH. L.
REv. 1367 at 1371 (1952).
45 See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
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that it lays down a much narrower rule, viz., that a confession may be
submitted with independent evidence when under state practice the
jury determines the ultimate admissibility of the confession. In short,
it appears that Stein does not sanction the use of evidence apart from
the confession for the purpose of corroborating the confession, but only
as an independent basis for guilt in the event the jury finds the confession submitted with the other evidence to have been coerced.

"III.

Conclusions

Although unprecedented and initially somewhat startling, it is
believed that the result of the Stein case· is consistent with established
due process concepts, for all that was decided is that it is not a denial
of due process to submit a confession, objected to as obtained by
coercion, to a jury along with other evidence.46 The aim of due process
is to give an accused a fair trial; it is difficult to see how submitting a
confession to a jury along with other evidence denies a fair trial in a
legal system which regards jury trial in a criminal case a valuable right
of an accused. But if the case is regarded as a somewhat aberrant
notion of a non-prejudicial infringement of procedural due process,47
it seems reasonably clear that the doctrine will be carefully limited to
the confession cases in those states which allow the jury to play a part
in the determination of the admissibility of a confession. The most
significant consequence of the decision is that it recognizes the legality
of existing practices with respect to submitting confessions to juries in
states such as New York. In the states where the ultimate determination on the admissibility of a confession is made by the trial judge, it
would seem that the decision is of little consequence. The alarm
voiced by the dissenters that the case overturns settled principles of
constitutional law seems largely unjustified. In light of practical considerations and the fact that due process safeguards are not appreciably
diluted, Stein v. People of State of New York seems to be a sound
decision.
Marvin 0. Young, S.Ed.
46 Justice Jackson makes this clear in the principal case at 193 where he says: " •••
we base our decision, not upon grounds that error has been harmless, but upon the ground
that we find no constitutional error."
47 It is interesting to note that in areas outside criminal procedure, an aggrieved party
may have to show prejudicial denial of procedural due process. See, e.g., Market Street
Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 324 U.S. 548, 65 S.Ct. 770 (1945); NLRB
v. Ford Motor Co., (6th Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 905 (both cases involved a claim of
denial of due process in an administrative proceeding).

